Do people trust more when they are happy or when they are sad? Evidence from an experiment

This paper deals with the role played by incidental emotions on trust decisions. Based on a laboratory experiment with monetary incentives, we explore the way positive and negative emotions impact transfers in a trust game. In addition, we investigate the mechanism through which risk intervenes in the relationship between emotions and trust. Our results suggest that negative emotions influence trust positively, whereas positive emotions decrease trust. This effect disappears once risk is included to the game. Furthermore, we found that transfer in the trust game is driven by other‐regarding preferences and by risk preferences.     

A Stackelberg game-based approach for interactions among Internet service providers and content providers

NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking - This paper studies non-neutral market share where Internet service providers (ISPs) charge content providers (CPs) for the content delivery....     

Effects of Advice on Auditor Whistleblowing Propensity: Do Advice Source and Advisor Reassurance Matter?

Journal of Business Ethics - We conduct an experiment to investigate the joint effects of advisor reassurance and advice source in enhancing the impact of advice on auditors’ whistleblowing...     

Attracting investors for public health programmes with Social Impact Bonds

ABSTRACT

Social impact bonds (SIBs) have emerged as an innovative financing mechanism. This paper explores how health SIBs align with investors’ expectations and the conditions required to attract investors. At present, health SIBs are unlikely to provide sufficient financial returns given their financial risk to attract mainstream investors, so may be better suited to investors who are prepared to accept lower financial returns blended with particular health impact returns.     

Inefficiency and heterogeneity in Turkish banking: 1990–2000

Recent studies have stressed the importance of privatization and openness to foreign competition for bank efficiency and economic growth. We study bank efficiency in Turkey, an emerging economy with great heterogeneity in bank types and ownership structures. Earlier studies of Turkish banking had three limitations: (i) excessive reliance on cost‐function frontier analyses, wherein volume of loans is a measure of banking output; (ii) pooling all banks or imposing ad hoc heterogeneity assumptions; and (iii) lack of a comprehensive panel data set for proper analysis of productivity and heterogeneity. We use an estimation–classification procedure to find likelihood‐driven classification of bank technologies in an 11‐year panel. In addition, we augment traditional cost‐frontier analysis with a labour‐efficiency analysis. We conclude that state banks are not particularly inefficient overall, but that they do utilize labour inefficiently. This partially supports recent calls for privatization. We also conclude that special finance houses (or Islamic banks) utilize the same technology as conventional domestic banks, and do so relatively efficiently. This suggests that they do not cause harm to the financial system. Finally, we conclude that foreign banks utilize a different technology from domestic ones. This suggests that one should not overstate their value to the financial sector. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The microstructural foundations of leverage effect and rough volatility

We show that typical behaviors of market participants at the high frequency scale generate leverage effect and rough volatility. To do so, we build a simple microscopic model for the price of an asset based on Hawkes processes. We encode in this model some of the main features of market microstructure in the context of high frequency trading: high degree of endogeneity of market, no-arbitrage property, buying/selling asymmetry and presence of metaorders. We prove that when the first three of these stylized facts are considered within the framework of our microscopic model, it behaves in the long run as a Heston stochastic volatility model, where a leverage effect is generated. Adding the last property enables us to obtain a rough Heston model in the limit, exhibiting both leverage effect and rough volatility. Hence we show that at least part of the foundations of leverage effect and rough volatility can be found in the microstructure of the asset.     

Optimal portfolios when volatility can jump

We consider an asset allocation problem in a continuous-time model with stochastic volatility and jumps in both the asset price and its volatility. First, we derive the optimal portfolio for an investor with constant relative risk aversion. The demand for jump risk includes a hedging component, which is not present in models without volatility jumps. We further show that the introduction of derivative contracts can have substantial economic value. We also analyze the distribution of terminal wealth for an investor who uses the wrong model, either by ignoring volatility jumps or by falsely including such jumps, or who is subject to estimation risk. Whenever a model different from the true one is used, the terminal wealth distribution exhibits fatter tails and (in some cases) significant default risk.     

The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia

Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cross‐Country Evidence on the Importance of Auditor Choice to Corporate Debt Maturity

We examine the importance of Big Four audits in reducing agency costs evident in corporate debt maturity worldwide. Analyzing a large sample of public firms from 42 countries reveals that the fraction of long‐term debt in firms' capital structures rises with the presence of a Big Four auditor, suggesting that higher‐quality audits substitute for short‐term debt for monitoring purposes. In additional analyses, we find that the role that auditor choice plays in debt maturity is concentrated in firms from countries with strong legal institutions governing property rights and creditor rights. Collectively, our research implies that Big Four audits matter to corporate debt maturity, although the impact is isolated in firms operating in countries with more protective legal regimes.     

How does shopper-based mall equity generate mall loyalty? A conceptual model and empirical evidence

Understanding the antecedents of shopper mall loyalty remains one of the crucial issues for both mall managers and retailing researchers. We propose a conceptual model that explains the psychological process by which shopper-based mall equity (e.g., the perceived mall value) generates mall loyalty. We collected data from shoppers in two urban North-American shopping malls (N=905). The empirical results were generally supportive of the model: Mall loyalty was significantly predicted by the commitment that shoppers held toward the mall; and that commitment, in turn, was significantly predicted by shopper's positive awareness of the mall's characteristics, and shopper's self-congruity. The latter construct, in turn, was significantly predicted by mall image dimensions such as the mall's environment and the quality of the products and services found in the mall. We also found the model to be invariant between female and male shoppers. Theoretical and managerial implications of the model and the findings were also discussed.